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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INGA-LILL ELTON, 
vs. 
Respondent, 
Plaintiff-
UT AH ST ATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
an agency of the ST A TE OF UT AH, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No. 
12809 
APP·ELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Defendant-Appellant respectfully petitions the court, in 
accordance with Rule 7 6 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to reconsider its opinion in this case, to grant a re-
hearing, and upon said reconsideration and rehearing to vacate 
its prior decision, reverse the judgment of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County and remit the case with directions to 
enter judgment for the defendant-appellant. 
The decision should be reconsidered and a rehearing 
granted for the following reasons: 
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1. The Present Decision Conflicts With All Of The 
Workmen's Compensation Cases Decided By This 
Court In The Past. 
2. There Are No Findings Of The Trial Court Which 
Support Its Decision. 
3. The Decision As Issued Runs Counter To Well 
Established Concepts Of Workmen's Compensa. 
tion Law. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PRESENT DECISION CONFLICTS 
WITH ALL OF THE WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION CASES DECIDED BY THIS 
COURT IN THE PAST. 
Of the many workmen's compensation cases decided by 
this court one case, and only one, is cited in support of the 
decision on the merits (paragraph 4, Slip Opinion). The 
claim that that case, Powers*, is precedent for this decision will 
not bear scrutiny. 
Mr. Powers was a combat fireman. When the incidents 
in question in his case arose, he was on a swing shift filling 
in at various fire stations for other men who were off duty. 
A fire alarm was received at the station where he was working, 
the overhead lights went on automatically and a loud gong 
began to ring. He then and shortly afterward noticed symp-
toms consistent with a heart attack. The medical panel found 
no causation, and the Industrial Commission denied the claim. 
This court reversed and said: 
The law is well settled that the aggravation or 
lighting of a pre-existing disease by an industrial acci-
*Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 U.2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967). 
2 
r 
dent is compensable and that an internal failure 
brought about by exertion in the course of employ-
ment may be an accident within the meaning of the 
act. (emphasis added) 
Thus it is clear that the Powers case was decided on the 
ground that the employee was in the course of employment 
o.nd that an accident occurred at that time. 
Judge Elton was at his home in his bedroom when the 
fatal stroke occurred. He was not in the course of employ-
ment. The inescapable question is, Would the Powers case, 
a 3-2 decision, have been decided differently if the symptoms 
had occurred while he was at home in his bedroom? 
No decision ever rendered at any time by this court af-
fords support for the result reached in this case. The result 
here is contrary to law and under no state of the facts or of 
rhe findings can it be made to fit either the letter or the spirit 
cf the statute nor be made to fit any judicial precedent. 
2. THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT WHICH SUPPORT ITS DECISION. 
The court's opinion in this case states that "The issue 
presented by this appeal is therefore simply whether the 
tindings of the lower court are supported by competent evi-
dence" (paragraph 2, Slip Opinion). Findings? There are 
no findings. What pass for findings 1 through 3 simply recite 
uncontested, prosaic facts which no one ever disputed. The 
heart of the case is glossed over in "finding" No. 4, which is 
no finding at all, but the ultimate conclusion. The astound-
ing part of that finding is the "or" in the middle! Come on, 
District Court what's this "or" business in the middle? Either 
' 
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you find it or you don't. Since when are findings done in 
tandem? That's like the home plate umpire saying, "You're 
either safe or you're out." 
There is no great enlightenment m that finding of the 
lower court. \'\/hat did the court find happened to the judge) 
It doesn't even find that he had a stroke, although the Slip 
Opinion says he did. Did the accident which took him occur 
on the job or at home? Where is the finding on this point! 
\X'hat was it, anyhow, the accident which took him? \Y/hat did 
the court find caused the stroke? Was whatever caused the 
stroke an "accident" within the prior decisions of this courtl 
If so, what does the language of Redman 1 at page 285 mean 
when it says: 
"In other words the claimant has not met the onus 
of proving an 'accident' in the course of his em-
ployment that 'caused' the 'injury' of which he com-
plains, which burden is his." 
and what did Pintar" mean, saying: 
"It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensation that 
his disability be shown to result, not as a gradual 
development because of the nature or conditions of 
his work, but from an identifiable accident or acci-
dents in the course of the employment." 
and Carling' mean with this language, referring to the defini-
tion of "accident": 
"However, such an occurrence must be distinguished 
from gradually developing conditions which are 
1Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 U.2d 398, 
45-1P.2d283 (1960). 
"Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 U.2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 ( 1963). 
''Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 U.2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965) · 
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classified as occupational diseases and which are not 
compensable except as provided in Chapter 2, of Tide 
35 (Sections 35-2-1, et seq.), U.C.A. 1953." 
Mr. Carling was on the job engaged in his employer's bus-
iness, pounding air pipes with an air gun. Judge Elton was 
at home in his bedroom. 
There are no underlying findings of the trial court, 
findings on matters in serious contention between the parties, 
""hich support the legal conclusion that there was an accident, 
or that if there was one, it arose out of the employment, or 
arose in the course of the employment. The language of the 
Slip Opinion (paragraph 4), states: "This court has pre-
Yiously determined that aggravation of a pre-existing disease 
by an industrial accident is compensable and that an internal 
failure brought about by exertion in the course of employment 
may be an accident within the meaning of the Utah Work-
men's Compensation Act." It is respectfully suggested that 
the court erred in the assumption that there was any exertion 
in the course of employment or any accident in this case. 
3. THE DECISION AS ISSUED RUNS COUNT-
ER TO WELL ESTABLISHED CONCEPTS OF 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. 
This case involves directly only the claim of a judge's 
widow. However, the controlling language is the language 
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Statute and this de-
cision, sets a far-reaching precedent. 
One can hardly forebear turning to the language of this 
court in M & K Corporation, v. Industrial Commission, 112 
U. 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948), in which this court said, 
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"However, where a disease is involved, even under the liberal 
provision of our statute, we have refused to open the door to 
<: recovery for all injuries, without any causal relationship 
between the employment and the accident, ... ". Does not 
the present decision not only open the door but carefully re. 
move it from its hinges and place it over in the corner? 
SUMMARY 
The decision issued by the court in this case is a depar-
ture both from judicial precedent and the clear language of 
the statute. In the interests of justice it should be recon-
sidered and a rehearing should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. ROGER BEAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
190 So. Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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